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Inequality of Opportunity in Health Care in China: Suggestions on the 
Construction of the Urban-Rural Integrated Medical Insurance System 
 
 
Abstract: This paper investigates the urban-rural inequality of opportunity in health 
care in China based on Roemer’s (1998) theory of equality of opportunity (EOp). 
Following the compensation principle proposed by Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2011), 
this paper establishes a decomposition strategy of the fairness gap which we use to 
measure the urban-rural inequality of opportunity in health care in China. Empirical 
analysis using the CHNS data shows that the ratios of the urban-rural fairness gap to 
the urban-rural average difference in the use of health care are 1.167 during 
1997-2000 and 1.744 during 2004-2006, which indicates that the urban-rural average 
difference observed directly from original statistical data may underestimate the 
degree of the essential inequity. Meanwhile, the increasing fairness gap and the 
decomposition results imply that generally leveling the urban-rural reimbursement 
ratios is probably not sufficient, and pro-disadvantage policies should be put in place 
in order to mitigate or even eliminate the inequality of opportunity in health care 
between urban and rural residents. This implication is also illuminating for the 
experiments and the establishment of the urban-rural integrated medical insurance 
system (URIMIS) in China. Under the background of the dual social structure and the 
evident income gap between the urban and the rural, the pro-disadvantage policies 
will be more appreciated and effective in the promotion of the equality of opportunity 
in health care. And such positive role of the pro-disadvantage policies is supported by 
data from URIMIS pilot districts in Jiangsu province. 
 
Key words: Equality of opportunity; Health care; Fairness gap; Urban-rural 
integrated medical insurance system 
 
JEL Classification: D12, D63, I18 
 
Abbreviations: in this paper, we have used some abbreviations for convenience. Among these abbreviations, some 
are standard and commonly used; while some are not, such as URIMIS (urban-rural integrated medical insurance 
system), which refers to a newly developed medical insurance system at the service of both urban and rural 
residents. 
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1. Introduction 
For a long time, there have been large urban-rural disparities in health and health 
care in China due to the urban-rural dual systems and the deficiency of rural medical 
insurance system. Unfortunately, these disparities haven’t been effectively reduced in 
the early stage of health care reform. Although the New Cooperative Medical Scheme 
(NCMS), which is specially established for rural residents, has almost realized a 
whole coverage, its insurance level is too low to reduce the out-of-pocket health care 
expenditure. Therefore, the current NCMS seems of little help to effectively protect 
the insureds from the catastrophic health expenditure or the poverty caused by 
diseases (Wagstaff et al., 2009; Lei and Lin, 2009; Yip and Hsiao, 2009). Such 
situation will inevitably impede the human capital development in rural areas, thus 
being useless for the elimination of the poverty trap and relative deprivation, as well 
as for the equalization of public services. 
There is an urgent need to build an urban-rural integrated medical insurance 
system (for short, URIMIS), which aims to promote the urban-rural balanced 
development in health and health care. Although the development of URIMIS is now 
one of the major topics in China and the pilot experiments have sprung up in the 
recent years, the most widely used policies merely focus on increasing the 
reimbursement ratio, especially for rural residents, in order to reach a unified medical 
insurance system between the urban and the rural. However, it is not enough to level 
the reimbursement ratios for both urban and rural residents to cope with the 
urban-rural disparities in health and health care. Meanwhile, it will also be misleading 
if the integrated policies are expected to realize a similar health care expenditure 
between urban and rural residents. Pursuing outcome equality (such as the same health 
care expenditure) and reimbursement equality (such as the same reimbursement ratio) 
may result in inefficiency and even inequity in the improvement of the current 
situation, since there are intrinsic differences between urban and rural residents due to 
their individual or circumstance characteristics1. Thus we should pay more attention 
to the realization of the equality of opportunity (EOp)－an expression referring to the 
essential equality in this paper－in health and health care. Unfortunately, there have 
been few discussions and researches on the EOp in the domain of health and health 
care in China. Therefore, this paper aims to evaluate the urban-rural essential 
inequality in health care based on the theory of the EOp, and then provides our 
suggestions on the improvement of URIMIS policies. 
                                                        
1 We do not intend to dig into this issue, but we’ve given several examples in Appendix A as a simple explanation. 
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Based on the theory of the EOp developed by Roemer (1993, 1998, 2002), and 
the compensation principle for the EOp analysis proposed by Fleurbaey and 
Schokkaert (2009, 2011), this paper calculates and decomposes the urban-rural 
fairness gaps in health care in China. By using data from the China Health and 
Nutrition Survey (CHNS), the analysis results show that: (1) during the two periods of 
1997－2000 and 2004－2006, when we take urban circumstances as the “ideal” 
reference circumstances, the ratios of the urban-rural fairness gap to the urban-rural 
average difference (the EOp ratio of the fairness gap) in health care are 1.167 and 
1.744 respectively, indicating that an underestimation would be made if we simply 
take urban-rural average difference, which can be directly observed from the original 
statistical data, as inequality; (2) although the fairness gap and its EOp ratio increase, 
the significance of the effect of reimbursement ratio decreases in the later period, 
which probably implies that we should not expect the urban-rural inequalities to be 
narrowed only by generally leveling the urban-rural reimbursement ratios. An 
inference drawn from the above is that in order to realize the EOp between urban and 
rural residents in health care, merely unifying the reimbursement policies is not 
enough, and the dual social structure and the widening urban-rural income gap should 
be taken into consideration. For the medical insurance itself, pro-disadvantage 
policies2 are necessary according to the maximin principle of Roemer(1998). In order 
to prove this point of view, we have used the data from some URIMIS pilot districts in 
Jiangsu province for a further discussion3 . The results have well verified that 
pro-disadvantage policies indeed have superiorities in narrowing the urban-rural 
fairness gap in health care.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 is a simple description of 
URIMIS; theory of the equality of opportunity and the axiomatic frameworks are 
introduced in section 3, and the illustration of the EOp in health care and our 
decomposition strategy of the fairness gap are also established in this section; section 
4 outlines data sources and variables; section 5 calculates and explains the urban-rural 
fairness gaps in health care by using the CHNS data, and gets some interesting results; 
in section 6, a further discussion, also a verification of our inference, is conducted by 
using data from URIMIS pilot districts in Jiangsu province; and section 7 concludes. 
                                                        
2 We give the definition in Section 6. 
3 Although URIMIS construction policies are explored among pilot regions, there have been no unified standards 
for the policy evaluation and comparison yet. Therefore, we also hope that this paper can offer some practical 
suggestions on URIMIS construction and the improvement of health care fairness in China. 
 5 
 
2. URIMIS4 
URIMIS tries to overcome the household registration (hukou) restrictions, and 
integrates the two current separate medical insurance systems, the Urban Resident 
Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI) and NCMS5. With raising reimbursement ratios, 
especially for rural residents, as one of the necessary steps, URIMIS aims to ensure 
the same opportunities between urban and rural residents in health care and medical 
security, and to narrow or even eliminate the urban-rural disparities in health and 
health care. 
URIMIS is still at the exploring stage. Pilot experiments were set out first in 
some advanced regions, and various modes have been formed. It was reported that 
five provincial administrative regions－municipalities of Tianjin and Chongqing, 
Qinghai province, Ningxia Hui autonomous region, and the Xinjiang Production and 
Construction Corps－and 41 prefecture cities, as well as 162 counties (districts, 
county-level cities), had already established URIMIS at the end of 20116. Most of 
these URIMIS areas had drawn up integration strategies to bridge the gap between 
urban and rural medical insurance policies. The advantages of URIMIS have been 
affirmed by domestic researches, most of which, however, are just simple illustrations 
of the process of local URIMIS policies due to the short pilot time and lack of data 
resources. The qualitative researches are obviously deficient for the evaluations and 
comparisons of different URIMIS modes, and for the judgment about how URIMIS 
should be. Also, it may fail to understand the real effectiveness and efficiency of 
different modes of URIMIS, when intentionally or unintentionally selecting improper 
criteria. 
3. Theories and methods 
3.1. Equality of opportunity 
During the development of the equality of opportunity, Rawls (1971), who values 
the procedural equality more than the outcome equality, has made a huge contribution. 
Rawls points out that the public opportunities should be equally open to all 
individuals regardless of their races, religions or other factors, which represent the 
                                                        
4 In fact, China never gives up the urban-rural coordination and integration during her rapid development, and the 
new century sees her much greater efforts. URIMIS is just one part of the whole blueprint of the urban-rural 
integration. 
5 URIMIS is not simply to put URBMI and NCMS into one funding or one administration system. Usually a new 
basic medical insurance will be made to replace both of URBMI and NCMS, and its multilevel medical insurance 
policies can be freely chosen by urban and rural residents. 
6 The 2011 report are obviously a little outdated. The number of the URIMIS pilot regions is increasing rapidly in 
the recent two years. However, there has been no relevant official report published yet. 
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identities. This is written as one part of his second principle7 of justice. Another part 
of the second principle is about the fair allocation and the overall efficiency. And it is 
usually called the difference principle. This principle implies that the most 
disadvantage group should be granted the maximal opportunity. Therefore, the 
difference principle is also called the Rawls maximin principle. Rawls’s idea of the 
equality of opportunity has been further developed during the following decades. Sen 
(1980, 1999) emphasizes that people have the capabilities to choose the way of life 
they value most. Dworkin (1981a, 1981b) introduces the concepts of equality of 
welfare and equality of resources, suggesting that some disadvantages, which are out 
of individual control or without individual responsibilities, like circumstances and 
handicaps, should be compensated. Arneson (1989) and Cohen (1989) develop 
Dworkin’s theory, and bring forward separately the concepts of equality of 
opportunity for welfare and equality of access to advantage. Based on these theories, 
Roemer (1993, 1998, 2002) proposes an axiomatic approach, which becomes a 
famous framework for empirical studies on the equality of opportunity in the social 
science domain.  
According to Roemer’s framework of the equality of opportunity (EOp), one’s 
advantage (y) is determined by two categories, i.e. circumstances (c) and effort (e); 
the former is beyond one’s control, while the latter is not. The function is as follows: 
).,( iii ecyy                                                   (1) 
If we classify circumstances into J types and define that people in the same kind 
of circumstances belong to the same type, then given one’s effort e , the advantage he 
attains is required to be fixed no matter which type he belongs to. Thus a fair society, 
as Roemer (1998) explains, is a society that will maximize the advantage of those 
who possess the least advantage8, i.e. 
).~,(minmax ecy
c
                                              (2) 
Totaling the advantage of all individuals at each level of the effort, we obtain:  
     ,)(),(minmax deefecy
e c                                         (3) 
where f(e) is the density function of the effort. 
Roemer (1998, pp. 5－32) emphasizes that part of the effort can be affected by 
circumstances, which will indirectly affect the distribution characteristics of the 
advantage, and the society should take responsibility for this kind of interaction. 
                                                        
7 The first principle is about the priority of freedom, namely, it should be prior considered, on the premise that all 
people have equal freedom, to maximize the freedom that each one can enjoy. 
8 It is worth noting that Roemer puts forward a somewhat different proposal from that of Rawls, who cares about 
how to maximize the minimum level of advantage, however, across all individuals regardless of their types. 
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Therefore, the advantage one obtains should be in line with his (relative) degree of 
effort in his own type rather than the (absolute) level of effort. In other words, a fair 
society guarantees that people with the same degree of effort will obtain the same 
advantage irrespective of their types; or there is inequality of opportunity, and the 
society is no longer fair. As to the individual, one should take responsibility for, and 
only for, his degree of effort in his type; while one is not responsible for the 
distribution characteristics of the effort. In this way, Roemer defines the degree of 
effort using one’s quantile  in the conditional distribution of his type. Thus the 
expression (3) can be rewritten as: 
.),(minmax 

dcy
c                                            (4) 
And (4) can be regarded as an explanation of the maximin principle of Roemer. 
3.2. Inequality of opportunity in health and health care 
The introduction of the equality of opportunity into the domain of health 
economics can be traced back to the 1980s. Daniels (1985, 1996) refers to Rawls’ 
equality of opportunity and tries to make use of this theory into the analysis of health 
inequality. However, empirical work just sprang up during the last decade. Zheng 
(2006) introduces income-health matrix to measure the health opportunity and the 
inequality caused by unequal health security circumstances and socioeconomic 
structure. Rosa Dias (2009) proposes straight forward the empirical application of 
Roemer’s EOp. Using data from the UK National Child Development Study, he finds 
that there is significant inequality of opportunity in health and that circumstances, 
such as parental socioeconomic status (SES) and childhood health, can affect the 
self-assessed health level in adulthood directly and indirectly (e.g. through effort such 
as education). Rosa Dias (2010) further improves and enriches the measurement of 
inequality of opportunity by combining Roemer’s framework with the Grossman 
model of human capital and health demand, and discusses the partial-circumstance 
problem. Jusot et al. (2010) and Trannoy et al. (2010) do similar researches on the 
inequality of opportunity in adulthood health, with childhood condition as the 
important circumstances. Balia and Jones (2011) investigate a special case of health 
inequality, the inequality of opportunity in mortality risk among individuals who and 
whose parents smoke or ever smoked. These articles all emphasize both the 
importance of circumstances and the capabilities of change by effort for better 
conditions. Moreover, since health and education are two vital types of human capital 
and are interrelated, Jones et al. (2012) analyze primarily the role of education in the 
inequality of opportunity in health, and note that in some dimensions there are 
significant and economically sizable linkages between education and health.  
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As mentioned before, researches on the inequality of opportunity in the domain 
of health and health care are rather rare, let alone the relevant topics about China. This 
paper may be one of the first researches that combine the theory of the EOp and 
health care within the urban-rural dual social structure in China. We hope that our 
discussions in this paper will be helpful to the further understanding of the urban-rural 
health care disparities and the improvement of the URIMIS policy making. 
3.3. Empirical strategy 
3.3.1. Reward principle & compensation principle 
For the EOp analysis, Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009, 2011), within their 
framework of selective egalitarianism, propose two principles－the reward principle 
and the compensation principle. 
The reward principle encourages inequality caused by the effort, i.e. differences 
of the advantage are allowed if they are brought about by the effort. For this reason, 
when we measure the EOp, influences from the effort should be wiped off first. The 
typical method is to calculate the “corrected” advantage ỹi of individual i by fixing the 
value of the effort ẽ, i.e. ỹi= y(ci, ẽ). In this way, we can obtain the direct unfairness 
by calculating the inequality in ỹ using traditional indexes such as Gini index. 
The compensation principle requires that the inequality caused by the 
circumstances should be compensated. In other words, for the same effort, each 
individual should obtain the same advantage whatever the circumstances he is in; or 
compensation should be given to those who attain less advantage9. The typical 
calculation procedure under the compensation principle is first to set an “ideal” 
distribution of ci (c
*), and then to obtain the fair distribution of yi (yi
*) via yi
*=y(c*, ei). 
In this way, the unfair inequality of opportunity, i.e. the fairness gap, is (yi - yi
*). 
Though the two principles have something in common, they are in effect only 
compatible under one situation that c and e are completely independent, i.e. they are 
additively separable (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2009). Therefore, we need to choose 
between the two for empirical work. 
This paper bases on the compensation principle in view of the following three 
reasons. First, what we care about is how to reimburse rural residents for their 
disadvantage of circumstances. This is much closer to the logic of the compensation 
principle. Second, the reward principle is usually used to explain inequalities within a 
certain group, while the compensation principle, between groups. We concern in this 
paper whether the same health need obtains the same health care between urban and 
                                                        
9 Obviously, this principle has a close relationship with the horizontal equity which indicates that the same health 
need should receive the same health care regardless of one’s circumstances, such as income level, region or race. 
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rural residents, and this is more in line with the compensation principle. Third, the 
influence of c to e is actually very common in the real world, which in most cases we 
cannot ignore. The compensation principle can reflect such influence to some extent 
and thus is more applicable to our research. 
3.3.2. When Roemer meets Oaxaca 
Following Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2011), we define c as a dummy indicator 
of hukou of urban residents (c=1) and rural residents (c=0). The vector e includes all 
the other factors which, during the analysis, will be classified into two parts, e1 and e2. 
The vector e1 is on behalf of factors whose correlation with c will bring about 
illegitimate urban-rural differences, e.g. income level and medical insurance types. 
Contrarily, the vector e2 is on behalf of factors which will not bring about illegitimate 
differences, e.g. health needs. In this way, the advantage, i.e. the use of health care hc 
in our empirical research, can be expressed as a function of c, e1 and e2: 
,)()()( 21 iiiii eechc                                (5) 
where β, γ and δ are parameters, α is the constant, and εi is an error item. What’s more, 
in accordance with the definition of e1, it is appropriate to regard e1 as a function of c 
and π (the degree of effort), i.e. 
).,( 11 iii ce 
                                                 
(6) 
Thus the function (5) can be rewritten as 
.)(),()( 21 iiiiii ecchc   
                        
(7) 
And a more general presentation of this function can be written as 
,)()(),()()( 21 iiiiiiii ecccchc   
          
(8) 
where we add μ and ρ to separately express the coefficient differences of 
and χ(ei
2) between urban and rural groups.  
Defining φ(c)=c and taking urban circumstances (U) as the “ideal” reference 
circumstances, then we obtain the fairness gap10 between urban and rural residents as 
follows: 
).|,(ˆ)]|,()|,([ˆ)|(ˆˆ.. 1112 RURRRURegf iiii     (9) 
The urban-rural inequality of opportunity in health care can be measured 
according to (9). Here we also obtain a decomposition form similar to that proposed 
by Oaxaca (1973). At the right hand of (9), the constant term can be regarded as a 
coefficient of variable I, whose value is 1 invariably. Here we consider I as one of the 
                                                        
10 According to Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009), the fairness gap should be y(ci,ei)- y(c
*,ei). However, in order to 
obtain positive values of the fairness gap and most of the factors, we use the reverse value expression here, i.e. 
y(c*,ei) - y(ci,ei). What’s more, since y(c
*,ei)and y(ci,ei) are the same for urban residents due to the construction of 
the equation, this fairness gap in effect is the difference between the counterfactual estimate of the rural residents’ 
health care expenditure in the urban circumstances and the actual health care expenditure of the rural residents. 
),( 1iic  
 10 
 
elements of e2. In this way, the former two terms 
2ˆ ˆ ( | )ie R  can be considered as 
the coefficient effect of e2, namely the e2 coefficient effect. It indicates that part of the 
urban-rural health care gap is from the insufficient health care expenditure of rural 
residents. The third term of this equation 1 1ˆ[ ( , | ) ( , | )]i iU R R R        can be 
regarded as the e1 environmental characteristic effect, which indicates that part of the 
urban-rural health care gap is from the difference between the counterfactual 
characteristics of e1－the same rural residents with the same degree of effort and the 
same effort distribution characteristics but in the urban circumstances－and its actual 
characteristics when holding the coefficient of e1 as constant as that of rural residents. 
The fourth term 1ˆ ( , | )iU R    can be regarded as the e
1 environmental coefficient 
effect, which indicates that part of the urban-rural health care gap is from the 
implacable urban-rural coefficient differences of e1. 
In our empirical research, we specify the linear form 
iiiiiii ececchc  
21 )()(
                        
(10)
 
for (8), and 
iiiii lcdbcae  
11 )(
                                     
(11) 
for (6). In (11) a is the constant, b, d and l are parameters, and τi is an error item. The 
estimated results from (10) and (11) will then be taken into (12), i.e. 
，)|,(ˆ)]|,()|,([ˆ)|(ˆˆ.. 1112 RUERRERUEReEgf iiii          (12)
 
for the calculation of the fairness gap. 
It is worth noting that the methods of obtaining π (the degree of effort) are 
different between the continuous variable and the discrete variable. For continuous 
variable such as income, the π of individual can be obtained directly from his rank in 
urban or rural groups which he belongs to. However, for discrete variable such as 
self-reported health status, the method is more complicated. We need to know the 
propensity score of each individual in his group (urban group or rural group) with the 
help of logistic model, and then to obtain his π according to his score.  
Meanwhile, this paper uses the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulation 
(Gates, 2007) 11－an approach of full information maximum likelihood estimation－
for the system estimation, allowing both the error terms of (10) and (11) to be serially 
correlated. 
                                                        
11 As Gates (2007) explains, the GHK simulation has excellent features, and it is widely used in the health 
economics domain, e.g. Deb and Trivedi (2006), Rosa Dias(2010) and Balia and Jones(2011), etc. STATA has 
already developed the corresponding command cmp, which is detailedly introduced by Roodman (2011).  
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4. Data 
4.1. Data sources 
The sample is from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) which is held 
by the Carolina Population Center of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
and the National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety at the Chinese Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention. The CHNS, an ongoing research project, includes 
data waves in 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2009, covering urban 
and rural regions in nine provinces which vary substantially in geography, economic 
development, public resources and health indicators. Subsample in each of the 
provinces is drawn via a multistage, random cluster process.  
This paper uses data waves from 1997 to 2006, among which data from waves of 
1997 and 2000 constitutes the group of period 1, and data from waves of 2004 and 
2006 constitutes the group of period 2. We make such data arrangement for the 
following reasons. First, in the analysis we only select the respondents who had 
suffered from illnesses during the past four weeks before surveyed12. Missing values 
in waves of 1989, 1991 and 1993 are too many to complete the estimation. Hence, we 
decide not to employ data from the three waves. Second, given that the URIMIS pilot 
actions have flourished since 2009, and there is no information that can help us to 
distinguish regions which are in the pilot experiments from those which are not, we 
have to drop data in the 2009 wave for safety. Third, the numbers of our target 
respondents are not big enough in some waves. If we estimate by using separately the 
rest four waves, it may discount the validity of our conclusions. Moreover, NCMS 
was established in 2003, offering a natural and reasonable boundary for pooling the 
data. As a result, the final data only includes respondents who had suffered from 
illnesses during the past four weeks before surveyed in waves of 1997, 2000, 2004 or 
2006. And respondents from the former two waves are pooled to represent the 
characteristics of the group of period 1; while respondents from the latter two waves, 
the group of period 2. 
4.2. Variables 
For the measurement of the use of health care, we employ the health care 
expenditure13, the same as most literatures do. During the selection of independent 
variables and the estimation, the key is how to differentiate between illegitimate 
                                                        
12 In the 2006 wave, the corresponding question in the questionnaire is “During the past 4 weeks, have you been 
sick or injured? Have you suffered from a chronic or acute disease”. 
13 In the 2006 wave, the corresponding question in the questionnaire is “How much did this treatment cost or has 
this treatment cost so far (including all registration fees, medicines, treatment fees, bed fees, etc.)”. 
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factors and legitimate factors (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2011). By referring to 
relative studies on racial/ethical disparities of health and health care (e.g. Institute of 
Medicine, 2003; McGuire et al., 2006; Cook et al., 2010; Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 
2011), we define that e1－the vector of illegitimate factors－includes variables 
describing individual SES, medical insurance policies and regional characteristics in 
health care, etc., and that e2－the vector of legitimate factors－includes variables 
describing health needs and individual preferences. Specifically, variables in e1 can be 
classified into three parts: (1) SES variables, including family per capita income and 
education; (2) policy variable, i.e. reimbursement ratio; and (3) environmental 
variables related to health care, including region, medicines availability and travel 
time for doctor visits. Variables in e2 are classified into four parts: (1) demographic 
variables, including age, sex and marital status; (2) general health variables, including 
self-reported health status and chronic disease history; (3) health variables reflecting 
situations of illness, i.e. types of illness one has suffered from and the severity of the 
illness, during the past four weeks; and (4) preference variables, including treatment 
preferences and lifestyle preferences such as whether smoke or drink. 
As is known, the actual reimbursement ratio－the proportion of health care 
expenditure paid for by medical insurance14－may be the best indicator to measure 
the insuring level and the economic burden of health care, compared to indicators 
about whether one has participated in any medical insurance or what the name of the 
participated medical insurance is. However, this is only feasible for respondents 
whose health expenditures are not zero. In the process of data disposing, we have 
done some adjustment to cope with the zero problems. For respondents who do 
participate in medical insurances but spend zero on health care, we take their 
self-reported policy reimbursement ratios15 as replacements. If one’s self-reported 
policy reimbursement ratios are missing, then we replace the missing values with the 
average ratio of other matched respondents who are in the same city, enjoying the 
same medical insurance and having the same health status as him. 
Meanwhile, the treatment preferences are usually ignored in the health care 
researches, especially in relevant researches in China. This paper controls the 
treatment preferences to some extent via the question of “what did you do when you 
felt ill”. 
The final sample includes 4168 individuals, 1076 of which are from the group of 
period 1, and 3092 are from the group of period 2. In period 1, 412 respondents, 
                                                        
14 In the 2006 wave, the corresponding question in the questionnaire is “What percentage of these costs was paid 
by insurance or may be paid by insurance”. 
15 In the 2006 wave, the corresponding questions are “What percentage of the fees for outpatient care does your 
insurance pay (not including registration fee)” and “What percentage of the fees for inpatient care does your 
insurance pay (not including food expenses)”. 
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making up 38.3% of the subsample, are from urban areas. And in period 2, there are 
1283 urban respondents and 1809 rural respondents, with the proportion of urban 
residents increasing to 41.5%. The description of variables is shown in Table 1, in 
which we see obvious urban-rural differences in the four-week health care 
expenditure. The average differences are 225.096 yuan 16  and 268.149 yuan 
respectively in period 1 and period 2, with the urban residents expending more in both 
periods. Urban-rural differences of SES variables (e.g. income and education) and 
policy variable (i.e. actual reimbursement ratio) are evident, too. The urban-rural 
medical environmental differences seem small, which are somewhat counter-intuitive. 
Maybe these available variables are not able to reflect the qualities of health care 
properly or completely, although they do show differences. However, they are still 
reserved for the analysis of the fairness gap. 
[Please insert Table 1 here] 
5. Results 
How serious is the urban-rural inequality of opportunity in health care? We turn 
to the decomposition strategy in section 3.3.2 for analyzing each fairness gap in 
period 1 and period 2. The results are shown in Table 2. 
[Please insert Table 2 here] 
When the urban circumstances are regarded as the “ideal” reference 
circumstances, just as Table 2 implies, the total fairness gap is 262.670 yuan in period 
1. Given that the directly observed urban-rural average difference in health care in the 
same period is 225.096 yuan, the ratio of the fairness gap to the average difference 
(the EOp ratio of the fairness gap) in heath care in period 1 is 1.167. Intuitively, this 
ratio indicates if the original data shows that urban residents on average spend 100 
yuan more than rural residents on health care, the truth is that urban residents should 
have spent averagely 16.7 yuan less than rural residents. In other words, the fairness 
gap will reach as much as 116.7 yuan if the data shows a 100-yuan average difference 
between urban and rural residents. Similarly, the urban-rural average difference in 
health care in period 2 is 268.149 yuan, but the estimated fairness gap in the same 
period reaches as much as 467.521 yuan. Therefore, the EOp ratio of the fairness gap 
in period 2 is as high as 1.744. This number indicates that if the average health care 
expenditure of rural residents is 100 yuan less than that of urban residents, according 
to the EOp, it should have been 74.4 yuan more than that of urban residents. Since the 
                                                        
16 Prices involved in our study are inflated to the 2009 level according to relevant information supplied by CHNS. 
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EOp ratios of the fairness gap of the two periods both exceed 100%, the average 
differences have underestimated the essential inequities between the urban and the 
rural in both periods. Hence, we may say that compared to the outcome inequality, the 
inequality of opportunity implies a much worse situation of rural residents in health 
care. Moreover, the value of the fairness gap in period 2 is bigger than that of period 
1, which shows an increase of the inequality of opportunity as the time goes.  
For the three decomposition parts of the fairness gap, Table 2 shows that the e2 
coefficient effect is always predominant, accounting for 57.75% of the whole fairness 
gap in period 1 and 67.25% in period 2. The EOp ratios of the e2 coefficient effect are 
0.674 in period 1 and 1.173 in period 2. We may think about this effect and its 
importance from the aspects of health consciousness and service qualities. There are 
ingrained differences between urban and rural residents in the consciousness of health 
and health care－urban residents prefer more to health investment. Meanwhile, there 
are differences in health service qualities between the urban and the rural－urban 
residents usually receive better medicine and medical techniques.
  
The e1 environmental coefficient effect, according to Table 2, does not play a big 
role. Its EOp ratios are 0.085 in period 1 and 0.048 in period 2. Meanwhile, the EOp 
ratios of the e1 environmental characteristic effect are 0.408 and 0.522 respectively, 
making up 34.96% of the whole fairness gap in period 1 and 29.93% in period 2. The 
absolute contribution of the e1 environmental characteristic effect to the fairness gap 
increases, while its relative contribution does in the opposite way. 
Table 2 also shows interesting changes of the
 
influential powers of some 
variables belonging to
 
e1 (the vector of illegitimate factors), especially the 
reimbursement ratio and the family per capita income. The reimbursement ratio, 
which plays a big role in period 1, shows little importance in period 2, e.g. the EOp 
ratio of the reimbursement ratio in the e1 environmental characteristic effect is 0.236, 
but falls to as little as 0.003 in period 2. One possible interpretation is that before the 
establishment of NCMS (in period 1), many rural residents were lack of sufficient and 
efficient medical insurances, and participating in some medical insurances (e.g. 
UEBMI)
 
－or more straightly speaking, enjoying a certain reimbursement in the 
outpatient or inpatient services－represented some kind of privilege. Such privilege in 
health care usually related to better health services and lower prices. On the one hand, 
the privilege encouraged insureds to seek health care. On the other hand, non-insureds, 
especially poor rural residents, would be reluctant to purchase health care unless they 
were seriously ill. As the urban residents－especially urban workers and government 
officers－and a few rich rural residents got most of the privilege in period 1, the effect 
of the reimbursement ratio cannot be overlooked. While in period 2, NCMS had been 
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already established. More and more rural residents had participated in NCMS and 
enjoyed the reimbursement benefit. The reimbursement ratio was not a privilege for 
just a certain group of people any longer, although there was still obvious difference 
in reimbursement between urban and rural residents due to different medical 
insurance policies of UEBMI, URBMI and NCMS. Therefore, the effect of the 
reimbursement ratio becomes so small that we can even ignore it in period 2. 
Meanwhile, the effect of the family per capita income shows a distinct increase 
in period 2. A possible explanation is that the consumption of health care was 
becoming less passive after the establishment of NCMS. As mentioned above, in 
period 1 when NCMS had not been established yet, many rural residents, especially 
the poor, were lack of sufficient and efficient medical insurances and health care 
services. As a result, the health care consumption in the rural was a kind of passive 
consumption. For most rural residents, they would not go to hospital until they had 
been seriously ill. Therefore, income was almost irrelevant to the health care 
expenditure in this period. While in period 2 when NCMS had already been 
established, more and more rural residents participated in this medical insurance. The 
health-seeking behaviors and health perceptions changed gradually among rural 
residents, and the health care consumption became more and more active. Table 3 
proves the above explanation by quantile regressions for rural residents. The health 
care expenditure is not significantly dependent on income in period 1 (except at the 
0.9 quantile); while this situation has been reversed in period 2. Therefore, the 
influence of income on the fairness gap increased during 2004-2006. And such 
influence probably continues. 
[Please insert Table 3 here] 
In view of the index number problem in the Oaxaca decomposition that the 
results from using different indexes may vary largely, following the advice of 
DeMurger et al. (2007), we re-conduct the fairness gap decomposition, with rural 
circumstances (R) as the “ideal” reference circumstances, as a robustness test. Our 
conclusions above can still hold true according to the results shown in Table B.1 of 
Appendix B. 
6. Further discussion 
6.1. Preliminary inference 
We see in Table 2 an increase of the fairness gap between period 1 and period 2, 
and this increase is faster than that of the urban-rural average difference. Although 
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there is a clear rise of the reimbursement ratio for rural residents, the effect the 
reimbursement ratio has made on narrowing the fairness gap is rather small, and 
decreases sharply in period 2.
 
On the contrary, the effect of the family per capita 
income increases appreciably. Therefore, the big background of the increasing 
urban-rural income gap should be taken into consideration when improving medical 
insurance policies. Although it’s not the main concern of the medical insurance system 
to narrow the urban-rural income gap, such gap has already worsened the performance 
of medical insurance policies. 
There is no gainsaying the fact that the relevant government sectors, which are 
responsible for the medical insurance policy making and supervision, have made great 
effort to narrow the urban-rural difference in reimbursement. However, since the 
urban-rural income gap is widening, such effort may be counterproductive. Just as 
that described in the Example C in Appendix A, the income gap can only counteract 
the good intentions of current medical insurance policies, being a hindrance for 
URIMIS aims. Therefore, under the background of the widening income gap, only 
generally leveling reimbursement ratios between urban and rural residents, as we 
often see in the pilot URIMIS policies, is now obviously insufficient to mitigate the 
urban-rural inequalities in health care. On the basis of Roemer’s EOp, the 
pro-disadvantage policies on reimbursement are highly desiderated. 
The above is just our preliminary inference which needs further verification. 
Fortunately, in Jiangsu province, there are indeed some districts where the 
pro-disadvantage policies on medical insurance are implemented. We have made a 
special investigation from URIMIS pilot districts in Jiangsu province. The data will be 
helpful to the further argument. 
6.2. Jiangsu pilot URIMIS data 
The Jiangsu pilot URIMIS survey, adopting a multistage, random cluster method, 
had selected 6 districts17 and lasted from December 2011 to April 2012. This survey 
aimed to estimate the efficiency and the differences in efficiency of various URIMIS 
modes in Jiangsu province. Here we classify the districts into two groups according to 
whether they had implemented the pro-disadvantage policies for URIMIS. For 
judgment, we consult Gu and Li (2013, pp. 200 － 205) and define the 
pro-disadvantage policies as policies that offer fiscal subsidies to those poor rural 
residents who want to participate in medical insurances with a higher security level. 
For instance, if lower-income rural residents who should have participated in NCMS 
want to and now have the chance to－with the help of premium subsidies－select 
                                                        
17 They are Taicang, Wuxi, Wujin, Yixing, Xinghua and Jingjiang.  
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UEBMI, URBMI or some new medical insurance born after the URIMIS 
establishment, we will say that the local medical insurance policies are 
pro-disadvantage18. 
We select respondents who had got sick during the past one year before 
surveyed19. At the mean time, respondents with missing values are dropped. The final 
sample includes 2065 individuals, among which 608 individuals are in districts where 
there are pro-disadvantage policies (PD group), while the rest 1457 individuals are 
not (NPD group). The PD group has 311 rural respondents and 297 urban respondents, 
while the NPD group has 766 and 691 respectively. Table B.2 of Appendix B shows 
the detailed information of the data. 
6.3. Fairness-gap decomposition 
Table 4 exhibits the decomposition of fairness gaps for both the PD group and 
the NPD group by using the similar strategy with that in Section 5. An important 
finding is that the fairness gaps of the PD group are far less than those of the NPD 
group, no matter whether we take U or R as the “ideal” reference circumstances. The 
main difference between the two groups is located in the e1 environmental 
characteristic effect which is only noticeable in the NPD group. The results imply that 
the influential power of the e1 environmental characteristic effect is directly 
challenged in the PD group, since rural residents, who are with higher needs for 
health care but at lower income levels, are able to afford more health care in an 
advanced medical insurance system. Therefore, the pro-disadvantage policies do 
improve the essential EOp between urban and rural residents in health care. 
[Please insert Table 4 here] 
Table 5 supports the pro-disadvantage policies by quantile regressions similar to 
those in Table 3. In the NPD group, the correlation between income and health care 
expenditure is significant for most quantiles; while such correlation in the PD group is 
not significant at all. It is not difficult to understand. Comparing the NPD group with 
the group of period 1 or period 2 in Table 3, we see an improvement of the 
reimbursement policies, since the health care use of the rural poorest (at the 0.1 
quantile) becomes sensitive to their incomes, which is a sign of active consumption. 
                                                        
18 Compared with the other two, NCMS reimbursement ratio is smaller. Since rural residents at the lowest income 
level usually need more health care but cannot pay the bill, such pro-disadvantage policies will improve their 
affordability and reduce the health risks brought about by passive health care consumption. Besides, such 
pro-disadvantage policies offer privilege to the rural poor, but we do not call them pro-rural policies, because the 
policies are only available for poor residents in the rural, not all rural residents. 
19 The questionnaire of this survey is a little different from relevant parts of the CHNS questionnaires. Therefore, 
we change a few variables for the fairness gap analysis in this section. Please see Appendix B Table B.2 for 
details. 
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However, the NPD strategy is not sufficient if URIMIS wants to reduce the inequality 
of opportunity in health care between the urban and the rural as much as possible. We 
find better results in the PD group in which the fairness gaps are much smaller (see 
Table 4) and in which the use of health care seems unrelated to income (see Table 5), 
reflecting to some extent a based-on-need allocation of health care. Therefore, the 
insignificant correlation between health care expenditure and income in the PD group 
shown in Table 5 does not tell the same thing as that in the group of period 1 shown in 
Table 3. And compared with Table 3, the PD group also possesses a different 
explanation for the insignificance at the 0.1 quantile.  
[Please insert Table 5 here] 
Since this survey data is of cross section data, the average effect of treatment on 
the treated (ATT) of the PD group cannot be obtained from direct comparison with 
the NPD group. It is proved that under such non-randomized trial, the approach of 
propensity score match (PSM) may maximally mitigate the effect caused by the 
confounding bias and the sample selection bias (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985; 
Heckman et al., 1998). Therefore, this paper conducts four methods of PSM for 
analyzing ATT. The results are shown in Table 6. When we take U as the “ideal” 
reference circumstances, the pro-disadvantage policies can reduce the fairness gap of 
the urban-rural health care by 27.2%. When we take R as the “ideal” reference 
circumstances, the reduction is 58.3%. At this moment, we believe we have proved 
our inference described in section 6.1 that the pro-disadvantage policies will greatly 
help to realize the EOp in health care between urban and rural residents. 
[Please insert Table 6 here] 
7. Conclusions 
As one important part of the human capital, health is the basic premise for work, 
and is also vital to the human welfare (Schultz, 1961; Deaton, 2003). The health care 
inequalities would seriously harm the social welfare just as the income inequalities do. 
Thus it is of great importance to focus on the issue of equity in health care. Mooney 
(1986) points out that equality should enjoy the priority in the trade-offs of efficiency 
and equality in terms of health. Sen (2002) also proposes that the equity of health care 
is one of the major parts of justice for a country, and that the basic health care system 
should guarantee the civil rights to receive health care.  
Rural residents have made great contribution to China’s economic development. 
However, what they share from the prosperity is far less than what they should obtain. 
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The inequality in health care is just one conspicuous aspect among the urban-rural 
illegitimate gaps. Since the 21st century, China has been improving the rural health 
and health care conditions with great effort, including the expansion of NCMS, the 
raise of NCMS reimbursement ratios, and the exploration of URIMIS. During the 
improvement, it is being heatedly discussed, but without an agreement, on how to 
effectively reduce even eliminate the urban-rural disparities in health care. This paper 
suggests that focusing on the urban-rural inequality of opportunity is much more 
meaningful than focusing on the urban-rural outcome equality or reimbursement 
equality in health care. And generally leveling the reimbursement ratios between 
urban and rural residents is not sufficient to realize the EOp in health care. The 
pro-disadvantage policies are needed.  
This paper analyzes the inequality of opportunity in health care between urban 
and rural residents from a broader perspective based on the theory of the EOp. We use 
the framework of the compensation principle proposed by Fleurbaey and Schokkaert 
(2011) as the base for empirical analysis, and the fairness gap as a measurement of the 
urban-rural inequality of opportunity in health care. The Oaxaca decomposition is 
established and we define three parts of the fairness gap, the e2 coefficient effect, the 
e1 environmental characteristic effect, and the e1 environmental coefficient effect. We 
first measure the fairness gaps using data from CHNS in 1997－2000 and 2004－
2006. The results indicate that the urban-rural average differences which can be 
directly observed from original statistical data may underestimate the essential 
inequalities. In addition, we have noticed a dramatic change of the effect of 
reimbursement ratio and income during the two periods. Through further analysis, we 
infer that since the urban-rural income gap is widening, generally leveling 
reimbursement ratios between urban and rural residents becomes insufficient to 
mitigate the urban-rural inequalities in health care. Then a question may arise on how 
to make use of the medical insurance policies in URIMIS. We give our suggestion, 
which is in line with the idea of Roemer(1998)20, that the urban-rural income gap, 
which becomes wider and wider in recent years, should be taken into consideration in 
URIMIS. Therefore, under current situation, the pro-disadvantage policies should be 
made to help improve the affordability of the rural poor. Our suggestion is well 
verified by the pilot URIMIS data in Jiangsu province. The results show that the 
urban-rural fairness gap in health care can be narrowed significantly via the 
pro-disadvantage policies. 
There are inevitably some limitations in our research. In the further discussion, 
                                                        
20 According to Roemer, in an ideal equal world, resources should not be distributed on the basis of (absolute) 
level of effort of individuals especially when they are in different types, because circumstances may affect effort. 
Please see section 3 for details. 
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we use data from Jiangsu province as a supplementary support of our proposition. 
Although the data has covered the northern, middle and southern parts－the three 
major economic zones－ of Jiangsu province and is able to represent the 
characteristics of the URIMIS modes in Jiangsu and other advanced provinces, it may 
not be on behalf of the URIMIS pilot conditions of the whole China. Nevertheless, as 
mentioned before, this paper is a preliminary study on China’s special medical 
insurance policies by using Roemer’s EOp theory, in order to provide some useful 
suggestions on the further improvement of the medical insurance systems. We hope 
that this paper will inspire more interest in the field of the health care justice in China 
and other countries. 
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Table 1 
Description of variables. 
          Period 1                       Period 2           
      Urban          Rural           Urban           Rural     
Variables Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd. 
y 
Health care expenditure during the past 4 weeks 779.758 2201.553 554.663 2189.791 709.827 5039.766 441.677 2351.327 
e1 
Family per capita income (yuan/year) 6943.783 7030.383 4569.000 5328.661 10729.150 10548.700 5796.847 8870.297 
Formal education years  7.124 4.730 5.066 4.031 7.836 4.819 5.516 4.181 
Reimbursement ratio (%) 26.036 37.793 6.143 23.223 25.116 34.834 9.360 24.019 
Region (1= the east region, 0= others) 0.383 0.487 0.325 0.469 0.486 0.500 0.411 0.492 
Travel time (min.) by bike to health facility 17.197 20.373 16.089 18.706 14.499 14.464 13.439 17.789 
Medicines availability(1=yes, 0=no) 0.951 0.215 0.967 0.179 0.988 0.111 0.985 0.121 
e2 
  Basic Demographic Information 
Age (years) 53.008 16.252 52.322 15.692 54.145 15.897 55.435 14.686 
Sex (1=male，0=female) 0.422 0.495 0.438 0.497 0.434 0.496 0.423 0.494 
    Marital status (1= married, 0= others) 0.801 0.400 0.797 0.403 0.796 0.403 0.811 0.392 
General Health Information         
Self-reported health status 
(4=excellent, 3=good, 2=fair, 1=poor) 
2.138 0.750 2.056 0.819 2.228 0.797 2.061 0.785 
 Ever diagnosed High blood pressure (1=yes, 0=no) 0.182 0.386 0.148 0.355 0.246 0.431 0.170 0.376 
Diabetes (1=yes, 0=no) 0.158 0.365 0.123 0.329 0.194 0.396 0.132 0.339 
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Myocardial infarction (1=yes, 0=no) 0.015 0.120 0.014 0.116 0.014 0.118 0.009 0.094 
Apoplexy (1=yes, 0=no) 0.039 0.193 0.027 0.163 0.034 0.180 0.025 0.156 
    Illness During the Past 4 Weeks         
Suffered from chronic or acute diseases (1=yes, 0=no) 0.874 0.332 0.883 0.322 0.634 0.482 0.669 0.471 
Got fever, sore throat or cough (1=yes, 0=no) 0.359 0.480 0.357 0.479 0.373 0.484 0.362 0.481 
  Got diarrhea or stomachache (1=yes, 0=no) 0.126 0.332 0.131 0.338 0.156 0.363 0.153 0.360 
  Got headache or dizziness (1=yes, 0=no) 0.306 0.461 0.283 0.451 0.253 0.435 0.265 0.441 
  Got joint pain or muscle pain (1=yes, 0=no) 0.165 0.372 0.181 0.385 0.260 0.439 0.281 0.450 
  Got rash or dermatitis (1=yes, 0=no) 0.032 0.175 0.024 0.153 0.036 0.186 0.024 0.152 
    Got eye/ear disease (1=yes, 0=no) 0.034 0.181 0.026 0.158 0.062 0.240 0.050 0.217 
Got heart disease/chest pain (1=yes, 0=no) 0.102 0.303 0.069 0.254 0.112 0.316 0.082 0.274 
Got other infectious disease (1=yes, 0=no) 0.032 0.175 0.032 0.175 0.047 0.211 0.050 0.217 
Got noncommunicable disease (1=yes, 0=no) 0.158 0.365 0.149 0.356 0.244 0.430 0.187 0.390 
Severity of the illness (3=quite severe, 2=somewhat                
severe, 1=not severe) 
1.740 0.689 1.640 0.674 1.687 0.657 1.702 0.665 
Inpatient visits (1=yes, 0=no) 0.092 0.290 0.074 0.262 0.031 0.174 0.030 0.170 
Preferences         
What to do when felt ill (4=none, 3=saw a doctor, 
2=saw the local health worker, 1=self care) 
2.522 0.908 2.706 0.751 2.074 1.168 2.472 1.048 
Ever smoked (1=yes, 0=no) 0.250 0.434 0.304 0.460 0.313 0.464 0.307 0.462 
Drink alcohol last year (1=yes, 0=no) 0.316 0.465 0.280 0.449 0.341 0.474 0.280 0.449 
Number of sub-sample 412 664 1283 1809 
Source: CHNS data (1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006).  
Note: “Sd.” denotes standard deviation. 
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Table 2 
Decomposition of the fairness gaps using CHNS data. 
      Period 1             Period 2      
Average difference directly observed  225.096 268.149 
 Fairness gap Ratio Fairness gap Ratio 
e2 coefficient effect: 
Age 387.248  1.720  -801.470 -2.989 
Male 76.158  0.338  251.163 0.937 
Married -123.302  -0.548  -105.519 -0.394 
Self-reported health: fair 166.831  0.741  -593.614 -2.214 
Self-reported health: good 56.920  0.253  -305.803 -1.140 
Self-reported health: excellent 18.001  0.080  -29.494 -0.110 
High blood pressure 54.396  0.242  0.897 0.003 
Diabetes -79.090  -0.351  51.664 0.193 
Myocardial infarction 6.067  0.027  -4.507 -0.017 
Apoplexy 7.781  0.035  -3.898 -0.015 
Suffered from chronic or acute diseases 667.391  2.965  -165.665 -0.618 
Got fever, sore throat or cough -136.195  -0.605  90.036 0.336 
Got diarrhea or stomachache -28.023  -0.124  -44.276 -0.165 
Got headache or dizziness 78.907  0.351  -48.257 -0.180 
Got joint pain or muscle pain -1.126  -0.005  41.766 0.156 
Got rash or dermatitis 4.013  0.018  40.411 0.151 
Got eye/ear disease -42.756  -0.190  24.671 0.092 
Got heart disease/chest pain  34.711  0.154  63.017 0.235 
Got other infectious disease 39.230  0.174  17.924 0.067 
Got noncommunicable disease -64.060  -0.285  46.340 0.173 
Severity of the illness: somewhat severe 111.614  0.496  -4.149 -0.015 
Severity of the illness: quite severe 82.171  0.365  133.673 0.499 
Inpatient -8.388  -0.037  43.000 0.160 
To see local health worker when felt ill 0.692  0.003  -20.647 -0.077 
To see a doctor when felt ill 163.488  0.726  189.518 0.707 
To do nothing when felt ill 31.194  0.139  55.693 0.208 
Smoke -3.613  -0.016  -54.234 -0.202 
Drink -165.846  -0.737  -103.918 -0.388 
Wave -27.906  -0.124  -99.114 -0.370 
Intercept -1154.844  -5.130  1649.307 6.151 
Sub-total 151.663  0.674  314.513 1.173 
e1 environmental characteristic effect:  
Family per capita income -15.542  -0.069  147.014 0.548 
Education 70.475  0.313  13.324 0.050 
Reimbursement ratio 53.126  0.236  0.793 0.003 
East China -8.402  -0.037  -20.763 -0.077 
Travel time to health facility -9.245  -0.041  -0.729 -0.003 
Medicines available 1.352  0.006  0.373 0.001 
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Sub-total 91.763  0.408  140.011 0.522 
e1 environmental coefficient effect:  
Family per capita income -28.221  -0.125  87.714 0.327 
Education 129.135  0.574  16.578 0.062 
Reimbursement ratio 16.633  0.074  10.050 0.037 
East China -34.839  -0.155  -64.626 -0.241 
Travel time to health facility -68.028  -0.302  21.779 0.081 
Medicines available 4.564  0.020  -58.499 -0.218 
Sub-total 19.244  0.085  12.997 0.048 
Total 262.670  1.167  467.521 1.744 
Number of sub-sample            1076       3092 
Note: “Ratio” in the 3rd and 5th column denotes the ratio of the decomposed fairness gap as well as the total 
fairness gap, i.e. each cell in the 2nd and 4th column, to the directly observed average difference in the 
corresponding period. 
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Table 3 
Quantile regressions of health care expenditure on income using CHNS data (rural residents). 
Quantile 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
Number of 
sub-sample 
Period 1 
0.025 
(0.036) 
0.024 
(0.022) 
0.026 
(0.021) 
0.025 
(0.020) 
0.036* 
(0.021) 
664 
Period 2 
0.015 
(0.025) 
0.040*** 
(0.014) 
0.032*** 
(0.010) 
0.018* 
(0.010) 
0.007 
(0.013) 
1809 
Note: the dependent variable is the log of family per capita income; the independent variable is the log of health 
care expenditure; other control variables listed in Table 1 are not shown here. shown in brackets is the standard 
errors. ***, **, * represent significance at the level of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively.  
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Table 4 
Decomposition of the fairness gap using Jiangsu data. 
 
   U as the reference c    
Robustness test:  
   R as the reference c    
 Fairness gap Ratio Fairness gap Ratio 
NPH group 
Directly observed average difference 496.780 
e2 coefficient effect 208.544 0.420 287.731 0.579 
environmental e1 characteristic effect 201.116 0.405 224.092 0.451 
environmental e1 coefficient effect -182.754 -0.368 62.296 0.125 
Total 226.907 0.457 574.118 1.156 
Number of sub-sample 1457 
PH group 
Directly observed average difference 130.001 
e2 coefficient effect 66.259 0.510 61.196 0.471 
environmental e1 characteristic effect -17.271 -0.133 14.339 0.110 
environmental e1 coefficient effect -24.159 -0.186 -0.803 -0.006 
Total 24.829 0.191 74.732 0.575 
Number of sub-sample 608 
Note: “Ratio” in the 3rd and 5th column denotes the ratio of the decomposed fairness gap as well as the total 
fairness gap, i.e. each cell in the 2nd and 4th column, to the directly observed average difference in the 
corresponding group. 
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Table 5 
Quantile regressions of health care expenditure on income using Jiangsu data (rural residents). 
Quantile 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
Number of 
sub-sample 
NPH group 
0.055*** 
(0.013) 
0.025*** 
(0.009) 
0.013*** 
(0.030) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.0003 
(0.009) 
766 
PH group 
-0.016 
(0.021) 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
0.0001 
(0.002) 
311 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of family per capita income; the independent variable is the log of health 
care expenditure; other control variables listed in Appendix B Table B.2 are not shown here. shown in brackets is 
the standard errors. ***, **, * represent significance at the level of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively.  
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Table 6 
Fairness gaps under four PSM methods. 
        U as the reference circumstances          Robustness test: R as the reference circumstances   
  T size C size 
ATT (% of 
fairness gap) 
Standard 
error 
T size C size 
ATT (% of 
fairness gap) 
Standard 
error 
Nearest neighbor 
matching method 
e2 coefficient effect 311 157 0.040 0.062 297 199 -0.157*** 0.045 
e1 environmental characteristic effect 311 157 -0.475*** 0.056 297 199 -0.350*** 0.031 
e1 environmental coefficient effect 311 157 0.162*** 0.023 297 199 -0.127*** 0.013 
Total 311 157 -0.272*** 0.082 297 199 -0.634*** 0.056 
Radius matching 
method 
e2 coefficient effect 311 728 0.090** 0.043 297 679 -0.107*** 0.032 
e1 environmental characteristic effect 311 728 -0.534*** 0.028 297 679 -0.340*** 0.019 
e1 environmental coefficient effect 311 728 0.180*** 0.022 297 679 -0.132*** 0.011 
Total 311 728 -0.263*** 0.057 297 679 -0.579*** 0.039 
Layered matching 
method 
e2 coefficient effect 311 728 0.088* 0.056 297 679 -0.117*** 0.036 
e1 environmental characteristic effect 311 728 -0.531*** 0.050 297 679 -0.337*** 0.022 
e1 environmental coefficient effect 311 728 0.176*** 0.023 297 679 -0.133*** 0.011 
Total 311 728 -0.267*** 0.060 297 679 -0.587*** 0.046 
Kernel matching 
method 
e2 coefficient effect 311 728 0.085 0.057 297 679 -0.112*** 0.036 
e1 environmental characteristic effect 311 728 -0.530*** 0.044 297 679 -0.339*** 0.022 
e1 environmental coefficient effect 311 728 0.173*** 0.023 297 679 -0.132*** 0.012 
Total 311 728 -0.272*** 0.068 297 679 -0.583*** 0.043 
Note: “T size” denotes the sample size of treatment groups; “C size” denotes the sample size of control groups which include those living in where there are no pro-disadvantage policies; ***, ** 
and * represent the significance level of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively.
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Appendix A 
Examples of the Misleading Aspects of the Outcome Equality and 
the Reimbursement Equality in the Health Care Analysis 
 
In the introduction of this paper, we endorse the idea that we should focus on the 
essential equity, i.e. the equality of opportunity (EOp), rather than the outcome 
equality or the reimbursement equality of health care. Here we give three examples as 
a simple explanation. Example A and B explain the misleading use of the outcome 
equality, and Example C, the reimbursement equality. 
 
Example A: Suppose the aging proportion is higher among urban residents, who involuntarily 
have more health need, and thus more health care expenditure, than rural residents. Such 
urban-rural differences due to demographic characteristics reflect the effective allocation of health 
resources, and are indeed reasonable and desirable. Under such situation, policies need no 
interfere, while purchasing the outcome equality may result in inefficiency. 
Example B: Suppose there are two residents belonging respectively to the urban and rural 
areas. The health care expenditure of the rural resident should have been 1000 yuan because of his 
serious illness. However, as lack of money or effective medical security, his actual expenditure is 
only 500 yuan. Meanwhile, the urban resident, who enjoys a more generous medical insurance, 
spends the same 500 yuan for a health problem, such as flu, which could have been cured with the 
expense of only 100 yuan. There seems no inequality from straightforward the aspect of actual 
expenditure on health care. However, the essential inequality was concealed. 
Example C: Suppose there are two residents belonging respectively to the urban and rural 
areas and enjoying the same reimbursement of 50%. One day, they both are attacked by a same 
disease, such as flu. However, the rural resident decides not to see a doctor because of lack of 
money, but the urban resident does. Then, the premium paid by the rural resident in effect is used 
to reimburse the urban resident, resulting in the phenomenon of the rural help the urban or the 
poor help the rich. Thus when we judge based on the reimbursement equality, such as whether 
there are unified reimbursement policies for both urban and rural residents, there may also be 
essential inequalities. 
 
    Therefore, if we judge the urban-rural equality or inequality from the viewpoint 
of the outcome equality or the reimbursement equality, we may miss the essential 
inequality. Policies based on these theories may lead to inefficiency even inequity. A 
broad view is needed in analyzing inequalities in the urban-rural health care, and the 
theory of equality of opportunity (EOp) can avoid such mistakes or disadvantages we 
illustrate in the above examples. 
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Appendix B 
Table B.1 
Robustness test of Table 2: rural as the reference circumstances. 
        Period 1               Period 2       
Directly observed average differences  225.096 268.149 
 Fairness gap Ratio Fairness gap Ratio 
e2 coefficient effect:
 
 
Age 392.324 1.743 -782.817 -2.919 
Male 73.391 0.326 257.510 0.960 
Married -123.965 -0.551 -103.547 -0.386 
Self-reported health: fair 192.867 0.857 -556.721 -2.076 
Self-reported health: good 61.505 0.273 -410.789 -1.532 
Self-reported health: excellent 13.187 0.059 -39.637 -0.148 
High blood pressure 67.092 0.298 1.297 0.005 
Diabetes -101.040 -0.449 75.892 0.283 
Myocardial infarction 6.518 0.029 -7.149 -0.027 
Apoplexy 11.146 0.050 -5.252 -0.020 
Suffered from chronic or acute diseases 660.779 2.936 -156.815 -0.585 
Got fever, sore throat or cough -137.071 -0.609 92.643 0.345 
Got diarrhea or stomachache -26.994 -0.120 -45.075 -0.168 
Got headache or dizziness 85.231 0.379 -46.166 -0.172 
Got joint pain or muscle pain -1.028 -0.005 38.642 0.144 
Got rash or dermatitis 5.254 0.023 60.954 0.227 
Got eye/ear disease -56.747 -0.252 30.534 0.114 
Got heart disease/chest pain  51.078 0.227 86.451 0.322 
Got other infectious disease 39.139 0.174 16.848 0.063 
Got noncommunicable disease -67.785 -0.301 60.327 0.225 
Severity of the illness: somewhat severe 122.736 0.545 -4.157 -0.016 
Severity of the illness: quite severe 103.797 0.461 124.753 0.465 
Inpatient -10.483 -0.047 44.911 0.167 
To see local health worker when felt ill 0.367 0.002 -8.647 -0.032 
To see a doctor when felt ill 151.617 0.674 124.701 0.465 
To do nothing when felt ill 26.976 0.120 53.760 0.200 
Smoke -2.969 -0.013 -55.150 -0.206 
Drink -186.812 -0.830 -126.831 -0.473 
Wave -24.483 -0.109 -97.180 -0.362 
Intercept -1154.844 -5.130 1649.307 6.151 
Sub-total 170.783 0.759 272.597 1.017 
e1 environmental characteristic effect:  
Family per capita income -0.874 -0.004 72.381 0.270 
Education 18.030 0.080 6.352 0.024 
Reimbursement ratio 16.448 0.073 -16.123 -0.060 
East China -2.170 -0.010 -9.087 -0.034 
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Travel time to health facility -4.561 -0.020 -2.447 -0.009 
Medicines available 2.793 0.012 0.519 0.002 
Sub-total 29.667 0.132 51.594 0.192 
e1 environmental coefficient effect:  
Family per capita income -42.889 -0.191 162.347 0.605 
Education 181.580 0.807 23.550 0.088 
Reimbursement ratio 53.310 0.237 26.966 0.101 
East China -41.072 -0.182 -76.301 -0.285 
Travel time to health facility 2.187 0.010 -58.644 -0.219 
Medicines available -72.712 -0.323 23.497 0.088 
Sub-total 80.404 0.357 101.414 0.378 
Total 280.854 1.248 425.605 1.587 
Number of sub-sample 1076 3092 
Note: “Ratio” in the 3rd and 5th column denotes the ratio of the decomposed fairness gap as well as the total 
fairness gap, i.e. each cell in the 2nd and 4th column, to the directly observed average difference in the 
corresponding period. 
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Table B.2 
Description of variables of the Jiangsu survey data. 
         NPH Group                  PH Group           
        Rural              Urban               Rural              Urban        
Names of variables Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd 
y   Health care expenditure in the past year 1798.922 6824.057 2295.702 7926.267 2541.514 7840.156 2671.515 8891.821 
e1  Family per capita income (yuan/year) 15155.300 9106.527 19132.640 10200.820 13206.500 6069.876 18156.630 9523.793 
Formal education years 6.759 4.008 9.065 4.497 5.797 3.998 8.862 4.663 
Reimbursement ratio (%) 0.201 0.325 0.317 0.410 0.333 0.313 0.415 0.381 
Walking time to the neatest health facility (h.) 0.301 0.481 0.296 0.427 0.329 0.675 0.213 0.149 
Insurance type(1=UEBMI,2=MIUR,3=NCMS) 2.086 0.837 1.508 0.500 1.540 0.499 1.498 0.501 
e2   age 44.556 18.973 42.253 19.540 54.235 19.363 44.949 19.733 
Sex(1=female，0=male) 0.486 0.500 0.456 0.498 0.534 0.500 0.448 0.498 
Marital status (1= married, 0= others) 1.008 0.592 0.978 0.686 0.865 0.342 0.714 0.453 
    Household size 3.414 1.192 3.449 1.042 3.386 1.257 3.694 1.141 
Self-reported health status(1=excellent, 2=good, 
 3=fair, 4=poor, 5=very poor) 
3.354 1.217 3.467 1.183 2.916 1.172 3.155 1.195 
Whether have chronic diseases (1=yes, 0=no) 0.230 0.421 0.287 0.452 0.286 0.453 0.239 0.427 
Whether been in hospital last year (1=yes, 0=no) 0.110 0.313 0.107 0.309 0.125 0.332 0.135 0.342 
Severity of the illness (3=quite severe, 
 2=somewhat  severe, 1=not severe) 
1.892 0.607 1.795 0.662 1.807 0.668 1.758 0.627 
Temporal disability days 12.764 55.217 13.187 55.755 6.794 32.453 9.239 44.022 
What to do when felt ill (1= self care, 2=saw the 
 local health worker, 3=saw a doctor, 1= none) 
2.433 0.988 2.363 1.035 2.055 0.977 2.111 1.019 
Number of sub-sample 766 691 311 297 
Source: Authors’ survey. 
Note: “Sd.” denotes the Standard deviation. 
